An intentional tort that requires proof of a person intentionally (1) dispossessing another of the chattel, or (2) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another.
Reference Desk:
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559 (1996)
Trespass to chattel, although seldom employed as a tort theory in California (indeed, there is nary a mention of the tort in Witkin’s Summary of California Law), lies where an intentional interference with the possession of personal property has proximately caused injury. (See, e.g., Itano v. Colonial Yacht Anchorage (1968) 267 Cal. App.2d 84, 90 [72 Cal. Rptr. 823].) Prosser notes trespass to chattel has evolved considerably from its original common law application — concerning the asportation of another’s tangible property — to include even the unauthorized use of personal property: “Its chief importance now,” according to Prosser, “is that there may be recovery … for interferences with the possession of chattels which are not sufficiently important to be classed as conversion, and so to compel the defendant to pay the full value of the thing with which he has interfered. Trespass to chattels survives today, in other words, largely as a little brother of 1567*1567 conversion.” (Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra, § 14, pp. 85-86, fn. omitted; see also Zaslow v.Kroenert (1946) 29 Cal.2d 541, 551 [176 P.2d 1] [“Where the conduct complained of does not amount to a substantial interference with possession or the right thereto, but consists of intermeddling with or use of … the personal property, the owner has a cause of action for trespass” to chattel, but not for conversion].)
America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998)
The undisputed facts establish that Melle committed a trespass to chattels in violation of Virginia Common Law. Although authority under Virginia law respecting an action for trespass to chattels is sparse, case law suggests that trespass to chattels is indeed actionable in Virginia. See Vines v. Branch, 244 Va. 185, 190, 418 S.E.2d 890, 894 (1992) (“Where a person has illegally seized the personal property of another and converted it to his own use, the owner may bring an action in trespass,trover, detinue, or assumpsit. … One who commits a trespass to chattel is liable to its rightful possessor for actual damages suffered by reason of loss of its use.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). A trespass to chattels occurs when one party intentionally uses or intermeddles with personal property in rightful possession of another without authorization. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217(b). One who commits a trespass to a chattel is liable to the possessor of the chattel if “the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value.” Id. at § 218(b).
Courts have begun to recognize that the unauthorized mailing of unsolicited bulk e-mail may constitute a trespass to chattels under state law. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F.Supp. 1015 (S.D.Ohio 1997) (finding that bulk e-mailing by the defendants caused “the value of [Compuserve’s equipment to be] diminished even though it is not physically damaged by defendant’s conduct,” id. at 1022). The facts of CompuServe are nearly identical to the facts of the case at bar. In both cases, the defendants sent unsolicited e-mail advertising to hundreds of thousands of Internet users, many of whom were subscribers of the respective plaintiff’s Internet services. Both defendants concealed the origin of their messages by forging header information. Both plaintiffs alleged that processing the bulk e-mail cost them time and money and burdened their equipment. Both plaintiffs contended that they received complaints from subscribers, and both contended that the bulk e-mailers continued to send messages even after they were notified that bulk e-mailing was unauthorized. Indeed, because the CompuServe case is so strikingly similar to the current litigation and the trespass law of Virginia is so close to that of Ohio, we will rely on the reasoning of CompuServe.
In the instant case, Melle’s conduct fully satisfies all the elements of AOL’s claim of trespass to chattels. It is undisputed that Melle intentionally caused contact with AOL’s computer network by sending bulk e-mail messages; Melle’s contact with AOL’s computer network was unauthorized; and Melle’s contact with AOL’s computer network injured AOL’s business goodwill and diminished the value of its possessory interest in its computer network. Melle has provided no evidence whatsoever to counter the facts as alleged by AOL. In fact, he admits to contacting intentionally AOL’s computer network by sending over 60 million pieces of unsolicited bulk e-mail over a ten-month period. Melle Depo. at 51-52, 61. Melle admits that he received a cease-and-desist letter from AOL dated October 15, 1997, and that as a result of the letter, he knew his contact with AOL’s computer network was unauthorized, yet he continued spamming. Melle Depo. at 107. Finally, Melle offers no evidence to rebut AOL’s allegation that its reservoir of goodwill and its possessory interest in its computer network have been diminished by the bulk e-mailing. Levitt Decl. ¶¶ 14-17; Korn Decl. ¶¶ 21-25; Price Decl. ¶ 7. There is, therefore, no factual dispute as to whether Melle committed a trespass to chattels against AOL’s computer network. As such, AOL is entitled to summary judgment on Count V.