Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind

474 U.S. 481 (1986).

One-Sentence Takeaway: Providing a state vocational rehabilitation grant to a blind student studying for the ministry did not violate the Establishment Clause, as the aid was neutral and directed by individual choice rather than government endorsement of religion.

Summary: A 1986 U.S. Supreme Court opinion in which the Court unanimously held a state program to be constitutional which provided vocational rehabilitation assistance to physically disabled students and that was used by a blind student at a Christian college.

The Court noted that the purpose of the program was secular as it was designed to promote the well-being of the visually handicapped through the provision of vocational rehabilitation services, and no more than a minuscule amount of the aid awarded under the program was likely to flow to religious institutions.  The Court further reasoned that the purpose of the program was not to advance religion because the aid was available to all qualifying students without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefitted.

Finally, there was not any government monitoring involved in the program and, therefore, there was not any concern of excessive government entanglement with religion.

REFERENCE DESK

In Bush v. Holmes, 886 So.2d 340 (2004), a Florida court of appeal summarized the Witters opinion and its progeny as follows:

In Witters, Mr. Witters, who was blind, requested financial assistance to enroll in a seminary under a program of the State of Washington which provided financial aid to disabled students. The state denied his request. The denial was upheld in the lower state tribunals based on state constitutional grounds. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, but based its decision solely on the federal Establishment Clause. On review, the United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed. The Court held that the extension of aid under Washington’s vocational rehabilitation program to finance petitioner’s training at a Christian college would not advance religion in a manner inconsistent with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court nevertheless remanded the case, stating that the state court is of course free to consider the applicability of the `far stricter’ dictates of the Washington State Constitution.

On remand, the Washington Supreme Court again upheld the state’s decision to deny financial aid, this time on state constitutional grounds. The court rested its holding on the language of article I, § 11 of the Washington Constitution, which, the court concluded, “prohibits not only the appropriation of public money for religious instruction, but also the application of public funds to religious instruction.” Witters v. State Comm’n for the Blind, 112 Wash.2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119, 1122 (1989). The Washington court considered the language of the state constitution substantially more “sweeping and comprehensive” than the language of the Establishment Clause and, accordingly, the court reasoned that “applying federal establishment clause analysis would be inappropriate.” The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied Mr. Witters’ petition for writ of certiorari.

In its recent opinion in Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), the Supreme Court has again addressed the same Washington constitutional provision that it considered in Witters. As discussed in detail in section VI infra, the Court recognized that a state constitutional provision, like Florida’s no-aid provision, can preclude state financial aid to religious institutions without violating either the Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause. Locke, 124 S.Ct. at 1315. Thus, “there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause,” and states are free to “draw a more stringent line than drawn by the United States Constitution.”

As was the case in Witters, the supreme courts of several states have held unconstitutional under their state constitutions various forms of financial assistance involving school choice See Opinion of the Justices (Choice in Educ.), 136 N.H.357 (1992) (a proposal to reimburse private primary and relocating schools at a rate of 75% of the per-pupil cost of public education violates state constitution because “[n]o safeguards exist to prevent the application of public funds to sectarian uses”); Opinion of Justices to House of Representatives, 357 Mass. 846 (1970) (a proposal to give $100 to the parents of every school age child, whether attending private or public schools, would violate article 46, § 2 of commonwealth constitution, which provides that no grant, appropriation or use of public money or property shall be made or authorized by the commonwealth or any political division thereof for the purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any school or educational undertaking which is not publicly owned); and Chittenden Town School Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 169 Vt. 310 (1999) (holding unconstitutional state statute authorizing school districts to provide high school education by paying tuition for non-public schools selected by parents under Chapter 1, article 3 language of the Vermont Constitution, which provides, in relevant part, that no person ought to, or of right can be compelled to support any place of worship contrary to the dictates of conscience).