152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
One-Sentence Takeaway: Under the traditional common law rules (later abandoned by the courts), there was no liability on the part of a negligent manufacturer to another in the absence of privity.
Summary: Defendant contracted with the Postmaster-General to supply, and to maintain in safe working order, coaches to carry the mail. Plaintiff was a mail coach driver who was injured in a wreck caused by a defect in one of defendant’s coaches. The driver brought a tort claim against the defendant (a claim against the Postmaster-General presumably being barred).
Fearing an “infinity of actions” if the claim were to be allowed, the court ruled that claims for breach of a duty originating in a contract could be brought only by parties in privy to the agreement. The court’s ruling was based on two principles: first, that if such liability were recognized there would be no point at which such liability would cease; and second, that the only duty owed by the manufacturer to the users of its product is that which arises from express or implied warranty incidental to contract.
REFERENCE DESK
Suneson v. Holloway Const. Co., 337 Ark. 571 (1999):
[A]n 1842 English case called Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), wherein a negligent contractor was shielded from liability for a third party’s injuries because the contractor and third party were not in privity of contract.Peters v. Forster, 804 N.E.2d 736 (Ind. 2004):
The authority most often cited for injecting a privity requirement into what was otherwise a negligence claim is Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). In that case, a party entered into a contract with the Postmaster General to keep the mail coach in good repair. A mail coach driver was injured when the coach collapsed and he sought damages from the party charged with maintaining the vehicle. Denying relief and articulating the sentiment of the members of the Court of Exchequer, Lord Abinger declared in pertinent part:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue. . . .
Early American common law mirrored the English common law rule requiring privity of contract. Accordingly, although a contractor was held liable for injury that resulted from his negligence before his work was completed, “his responsibility was terminated, and he was not liable to any third person once the structure was completed and accepted by the owner.” W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser Keeton on the Law of Torts § 104A, at 722 (5th ed. 1984) . . .
The privity of contract requirement in the law of negligence has largely eroded. In a watershed decision Judge Cardozo, speaking for a majority on the New York court of last resort, ruled that a manufacturer of automobiles could be held liable in negligence to the ultimate purchaser of the vehicle, not just the immediate purchaser — the retail dealer. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). In essence, at least in the area of manufacturer’s liability, MacPherson stripped the privity requirement of Winterbottom from its lofty position. Our courts have done likewise. See, e.g., Perdue Farms, Inc. v. Pryor, 683 N.E.2d 239, 241 (Ind. 1997) (“Privity of contract is no longer required if a personal injury action for a defective product sounds in tort.”); Coca Cola Bottling Works of Evansville v. Williams, 111 Ind. App. 502, 37 N.E.2d 702, 706 (1941) (citing MacPherson with approval and declaring that “the rule now in the best reasoned cases is that the manufacturer of foods or bottled goods sold for human consumption may be held liable to the ultimate consumer for injuries caused by foreign deleterious substances in such goods regardless of whether or not there was privity of contract between them”).