417 A.2d 982 (Me. 1980).
One-Sentence Takeaway
Evidence of similar accidents or occurrences may be admissible where (i) there is substantial similarity in the operative circumstances between the proffer and the case at bar, (ii) the evidence is probative on a material issue in the case, and (iii) and the probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the countervailing considerations such a unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or undue delay.
Summary
Plaintiff, an elderly woman, sued the town of Kennebunkport (Defendant) for injuries she sustained when she fell on a sidewalk operated by Defendant. Plaintiff attempted to present testimony of individuals who owned businesses in front of sidewalk that approximately 100 people had stumbled or fallen at that same location under similar conditions in the two years prior to Plaintiff’s accident. The trial court excluded Plaintiff’s evidence and entered judgment on verdict for Defendant. The appellate court reversed and remanded.
The appellate court held that the trial court’s exclusion of Plaintiff’s evidence (testimony of business owners) was an abuse of discretion and constituted a prejudicial error. The court reasoned that a blanket rule of exclusion of prior similar happenings was incompatible with justice. Rather, the courts should apply a case-by-case analysis.
The court held that for evidence of similar accidents or occurrences, a trial court should first determine whether there is substantial similarity in the operative circumstances between the proffered evidence and the case at bar. Second, a trial court must determine whether the evidence is probative on a material issue in the case. Finally, even if the evidence is relevant, a trial court “must then consider whether the probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the countervailing considerations, that is, the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or undue delay.
Applying the foregoing standards to Plaintiff’s proffered evidence, the court of appeal held that the evidence was admissible: “Evidence that in the two years prior to the accident as many as one hundred persons stumbled or fell under similar circumstances at the same location, unchanged in condition, clearly satisfies the substantial-similarity foundational requirement and is highly probative on the material issue whether the sidewalk was in a defective condition at the time of the appellant’s fall. As demonstrated by its prepared objection to the introduction of this evidence, the [Defendant] was well aware of the evidence before trial and therefore would not have been unfairly surprised by its admission. Because the evidence was to be offered through the personal observations of two witnesses, its introduction would not have consumed an inordinate amount of time or tended to confuse or excite the jury. The excluded evidence was crucial to the case of [Plaintiff].” Id. at 986-87.
REFERENCE DESK
Harris v. Peridot Chemical (New Jersey), Inc., 712 A.2d 1181, 1193 (N.J. Super. 1998):
In Simon v. Town of Kennebunkport, Maine’s highest court said that, “where the proponent can show that other accidents occurred under circumstances substantially similar to those prevailing at the time of the injury in question such evidence is admissible subject to exclusion by the trial court when the probative value of the evidence on the issue of defect . . . is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues or by consideration of undue delay.”
Jones v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 145 Ariz. 121, 124 (1985):
While some of these objections may still be viable, recent cases indicate that the rule of per se inadmissibility [of evidence of other accidents] is “manifestly incompatible with modern principles of evidence.” Simon v. Town of Kennebunkport, 417 A.2d 982, 985 (Me. 1980).In Simon the court rejected a per se rule of inadmissibility of evidence of other accidents and stated: “Whatever the continued vitality . . . of an absolute prohibition against other-accident evidence, it is clear that such a rule did not survive the adoption of our new Rules of Evidence. . . .” Id. at 986; see also Sturm v. Clark Equipment Co., 547 F. Supp. 144, 145 (W.D.Mo. 1982), aff’d, 732 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting that under the Federal Rules of Evidence the absence of prior accidents is “relevant and admissible, assuming an adequate foundation is established regarding comparability of circumstances”).
Estate of Klink ex. rel. Klink v. State, 152 P.3d 504, 525 (Haw. 2007):
Evidence of other accidents may be “highly probative on material issues of a negligence action.” Simon v. Town of Kennebunkport, 417 A.2d 982, 985 (Me. 1980). “[E]vidence of other similar accidents or occurrences may be relevant circumstantially to show a defective or dangerous condition, notice thereof or causation on the occasion in question.” Id. at 984-85. But “the introduction of other-accident evidence may carry with it the problems associated with inquiry into collateral matters “Id. at 985.