Sudden Emergency Doctrine


A tort law doctrine under which a defendant is relieved of liability for negligence if there is evidence that defendant faced unexpected and sudden emergency not caused by his own actions and he acted reasonably under the circumstances presented — even if, in hindsight, defendant did not choose the best course of action.

Importantly, contrary to what some may think, this doctrine is not really a deviation of the general negligence standard — i.e., the actor must behave as would a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.  If the circumstances include sudden, unexpected, and stressful emergency not of the actor’s own making, the courts will allow the actor to ask the jury to take into account the stress of the emergency in evaluating  the reasonableness of his actions.  The reasoning is that the emergency leaves the actor little time to weigh his options, and therefore the actor should not be held to the same degree of acumen as a person who has time for deliberate judgment.

The “sudden emergency” defense is not available when the emergency arose from the actor’s own negligence or was not unexpected.

Reference Desk

Shiver v. Laramee, No. B283420 (Cal. App. 6/12/2018)

The affirmative defense of the sudden emergency doctrine, also referred to as the imminent peril doctrine, is set forth in CACI No. 452: “[Laramee] claims that he was not negligent because he acted with reasonable care in an emergency situation. [Laramee] was not negligent if he proves all of the following: [¶]  1. That there was a sudden and unexpected emergency situation in which someone was in actual or apparent danger of immediate injury; [¶]  2. That [Laramee] did not cause the emergency; and [¶]  3. That [Laramee] acted as a reasonably careful person would have acted in similar circumstances, even if it appears later that a different course of action would have been safer.”

“The doctrine of imminent peril is properly applied only in cases where an unexpected physical danger is presented so suddenly as to deprive the driver of his power of using reasonable judgment. [Citations.] A party will be denied the benefit of the doctrine of imminent peril where that party’s negligence causes or contributes to the creation of the perilous situation. [Citations.]” (Pittman v. Boiven (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 207, 216; see also Leo v. Dunham (1953) 41 Cal.2d 712, 714; Schultz v. Mathias (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 904, 912-913, disapproved on another ground in Scala v. Jerry Witt & Sons, Inc. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 359, 364 & fn. 1, 366 [“‘The test is whether the actor took one of the courses of action which a standard man in that emergency might have taken, and such a course is not negligent even though it led to an injury which might have been prevented by adopting an alternative course of action’”.)

California Jury Instruction No. 452:Sudden Emergency

[Name of plaintiff/defendant] claims that [he/she] was not negligent because [he/she] acted with reasonable care in an emergency situation. [Name of plaintiff/defendant] was not negligent if [he/she] proves all of the following:

1. That there was a sudden and unexpected emergency situation in which someone was in actual or apparent danger of immediate injury;

2. That [name of plaintiff/defendant] did not cause the emergency; and

3. That [name of plaintiff/defendant] acted as a reasonably careful person would have acted in similar circumstances, even if it appears later that a different course of action would have been safer.

Directions for Use

The instruction should not be given unless at least two courses of action are available to the party after the danger is perceived. (Anderson v. Latimer (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 667, 675 [212 Cal.Rptr. 544].)

Additional instructions should be given if there are alternate theories of negligence.

Sources and Authority

  • The doctrine of imminent peril may be used by either the plaintiff or the defendant, or, in a proper case, both. (Smith v. Johe (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 508, 511–512 [316 P.2d 688].)
  • “Whether the conditions for application of the imminent peril doctrine exist is itself a question of fact to be submitted to the jury.” (Damele v. Mack Trucks, Inc. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 29, 37 [267 Cal.Rptr. 197]; see also Leo v. Dunham (1953) 41 Cal.2d 712, 715 [264 P.2d 1].)
  • “[A] person who, without negligence on his part, is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with peril, arising from either the actual presence, or the appearance, of imminent danger to himself or to others, is not expected nor required to use the same judgment and prudence that is required of him in the exercise of ordinary care in calmer and more deliberate moments.” (Leo, supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 714.)
  • The “doctrine is properly applied only in cases where an unexpected physical danger is so suddenly presented as to deprive the injured party [or the defendant] of his power of using reasonable judgment.” (Sadoian v. Modesto Refrigerating Co. (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 266, 274 [320 P.2d 583].) The exigent nature of the circumstances effectively lowers the standard of care: “ ‘The test is whether the actor took one of the courses of action which a standard man in that emergency might have taken, and such a course is not negligent even though it led to an injury which might have been prevented by adopting an alternative course of action.’ [Citation.]” (Schultz v. Mathias (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 904, 912–913 [83 Cal.Rptr. 888].)
  • The doctrine of imminent peril does not apply to a person whose conduct causes or contributes to the imminent peril. (Pittman v. Boiven (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 207, 216 [57 Cal.Rptr. 319].)
  • The doctrine applies when a person perceives danger to himself or herself as well as when he or she perceives a danger to others. (Damele, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 36.)
  • “[T]he mere appearance of an imminent peril to others—not an actual imminent peril—is all that is required.” (Damele, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 37.)

Abolishment In Several Jurisdictions

The sudden emergency doctrine has been abolished in several jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Bedor v. Johnson, 292 P.3d 924 (Colo. 2013) (abolishing the sudden emergency doctrine in Colorado and reasoning that it had limited utility in the comparative negligence scheme and caused jury confusion); Wiles v. Webb, 329 Ark. 108 (1998) (abolishing the sudden emergency doctrine in Arkansas and reasoning that the doctrine was inherently confusing); Bjorndal v. Weitman, 344 Or. 470 (2008) (abolishing the sudden emergency doctrine in Oregon for automobile accident cases); DiCenzo v. Izawam, 68 Haw. 528 (1986) (the Supreme Court of Hawaii strongly discouraging use of the sudden emergency doctrine).

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